TWO KAFKA BOOKS

— Anne Fremantle

THE

Commonweal

Our Present Foreign Policy

Is Mr. Dulles' 'New Look' Based on 'Atomic Retaliation,' Or Is It Just an Extension of the 'Limited War' Concept?

by Chester Bowles

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THE

Commonweal

week by week

NUCLEAR WAR: A FALSE DILEMMA

THE quick and the dead: how narrow the division between those states in this time of the hydrogen and cobalt bombs—and how simple it can be to surrender our intellects.

Chester Bowles discusses many problems in this issue, thoughtfully and soberly. We will here take up the problem which has a mortgage on all the others: nuclear war.

The "massive retaliation" John Foster Dulles spoke of in January inevitably produces the vision of a flattened city, smoking, perhaps, and quiet. The phrase, chosen for its impact on the Soviets, has a dangerous effect on ourselves: it encourages the psychology of apocalypse.

Talk of massive retaliation makes people think that there will be no new war which will not be the last one, the end. People are unwilling to accept what appears to be the consequence of this policy, so they resist the policy. We see this in Europe, and particularly in Asia. No matter what merit a policy may have in principle, if it involves the threat of something totally unacceptable, it is unworkable.

In public discussion in the Western world, there seems to be an almost unanimous belief that there are only two choices in military strategy for the cold war: the use of conventional weapons only, as in Korea; or nuclear war with atomic population bombings, and the possible use of the H-bomb.

The hope of fighting a new war solely with conventional weapons is sheer fantasy. Russia has the men under arms to sweep through Europe to the sea in a matter of days, provided that she faced only conventional arms. With China, the Soviets have virtually unlimited manpower for use in a long war. But the fate of any new war would be determined in those first few days. If Russia took Western Europe she would hold the major part of the world's industry—added to her own manpower resources. The Soviets would immediately purge the leadership of the overrun nations, and eliminate dissident elements of the population. Liberation, even if possible, would be too late for Europe.

NATO has recognized that it cannot hold Europe with conventional weapons. According to General Gruenther, the strategy of NATO's defensive campaign would aim at forcing the Russian armies to mass—to make themselves vulnerable to atomic attack. There is absolutely no question but that a Russian attack in Europe would be met with nuclear weapons. And in the eyes of most people, that would mean the beginning of the general war of population bombings.

WE would seem, then, to face an appalling dilemma in discussing Western defense: to have military alternatives, one of which is unrealistic and the other unthinkable.

But is it a true dilemma? It is not. According to published reports, we and the Soviets now have a stalemate in *strategic* nuclear power: we each have the capacity to destroy each others' cities. But the United States has another kind of advantage in nuclear power. We have, according to reports, a variety of *tactical* atomic weapons, limited in size, scaled to attacks on specifically military targets. The Russians are said not to have anything like this arsenal of tactical weapons, and are not expected to have it for several years yet.

A war of strategic population bombings would be one of unimaginable horror. This was the prospect which undoubtedly prompted the Vatican's condemnation of the aggressive use of nuclear weapons. But Mr. Eisenhower has promised that the United States will not initiate the use of that weapon. Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, author of the British "new look," has said that any nuclear bombing of populated areas by the RAF would be preceded by a clear warning so that the target area may be evacuated. (There unfortunately has not been, as yet, any parallel statement from the United States Air Force or the President.) These are the first of the necessary ground rules which it is within our power to establish.

The next would be to declare that we will, if necessary, make use of tactical nuclear weapons

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against military targets only. These could conceivably be more merciful in any kind of new war than the use of ordinary high explosives. One atomic bomb, delivered by a single fast aircraft with an accuracy far beyond that of the last war, could take out of action a target that otherwise would require repeated attacks by squadrons of heavy bombers. The economy of delivery would save the lives of our airmen. The increased accuracy would save civilian lives. (It would be criminal to pretend that any war can now be fought without civilian casualties—but the use of tactical nuclear weapons, against military targets only, could materially reduce the percentage of civilian casualties.)

General James Doolittle made some suggestive statements about this plan in an address last January. He said that it has been proposed that the nature of our reply to any Soviet attack be made dependent on the manner of attack:

> If the attack were limited to military targets, our force should immediately destroy the Soviets' war-making potential—but *only* that. *This point is most important.* Our force would limit its strikes to: (1) military forces in being, particularly air forces—counter-air operations against aircraft, airfields, etc., (2) military stock piles and the installations needed for offensive operations, (3) lines of communications, (4) other military targets, such as troop concentrations. . . . This would tend to limit the use of atom bombs to the atomic battlefield. Failing that, it would, for the next few years, at least, enable us to fight and win decisively any war forced upon us—and the responsibility for atomic slaughter would rest clearly on the Soviets if it occurred. (Emphasis added.)

An April *Air Force* magazine study outlined the application of this policy to a European war:

> . . . a prompt and determined tactical atomic campaign delivered on airfields, ammunition and supply dumps, bridges, and railroad yards could reduce Soviet tactical air forces and armies in the field to something approaching impotence in a few weeks—perhaps even days. Furthermore, a very great number of the tactical targets attacked would be *on Soviet territory*: and the use of precise delivery and tactical bombs would concentrate atomic destruction on military targets, on both Soviet and satellite territory. Thus, the policy of using nuclear weapons does not necessarily mean a lessening of reliance on NATO, but rather the capability of deterring Soviet aggression against Western Europe with forces which the NATO nations can afford to support over the long pull . . . such a war . . . appears to be the only war we could fight decisively, with any hope of seeing Western Europe rise again afterwards. . . .

This plan, which we have stated in general terms, is now being advanced by certain policymakers in our Defense establishment. It has not been given entire endorsement. But in January, General Nathan Twining, head of the Air Force, said:

> The word "retaliation" is misleading if it is assumed to mean "revenge." . . . It would serve neither humanitarian nor military purposes to kill hundreds of thousands of people in an enemy nation just to compensate for similar loss of life in our own country. If the people of the enemy nation are the victims of a dictatorship it would be even more pointless. . . .
>
> We can now aim directly to disarm an enemy rather than to destroy him as was so often necessary in warfare of the past . . . we shall hold to this principle: America plans no wanton destruction of people under enemy control, and we have no desire for revenge. . . .

The statement by General Twining marks a principle which this magazine believes to be absolutely fundamental. The plan we have discussed seems to us to offer a sound method of implementing the principle. If we made it clear to world opinion that we would reply *in kind* to a Soviet attack against any member of the free world; that we are framing our strategy in terms of nuclear attacks against *specifically defined military targets,* we would stand a good chance of preventing the kind of war the world dreads.

NEXT WEEK

GUNNAR D. KUMLIEN writes from Rome about the current struggle of the Italian clergy with Communism.

"The parish priest has found himself confronted by otherwise good Catholics who respectfully but stubbornly refuse to believe him on this one point: Communism. These people believe everything the Church teaches except what it teaches on that subject. If the priest cites religious persecution in Soviet Russia and in China as concrete examples of the incompatibility between Catholicism and Communism, the reply is invariably the same: Italian Communism is different from Communism in other countries. Italian Communism has never proved to be anti-religious. . . . Togliatti's strategy never openly to attack religion has paid dividends and paid well."

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DECLINE OF THE INDEPENDENTS

WHEN for one reason, or several, the American economy starts to back-pedal, the automobile industry is naturally among the first to feel the effects. The present setback is no exception. What is curious is the way the losses are dividing up. For the first three months of this year Chrysler and the smaller auto makers find themselves way below 1953. General Motors and Ford between them are producing eighty per cent of all the new cars.

Why should this be? There may be some feeling that certain models in the Chrysler stable are lagging in styling or performance, but that is hardly true of the "independents." Studebaker, for instance, boasts the most advanced styling of any standard make and at the same time has just made far and away the best showing at the exacting fifth annual Mobilgas Economy Run (a Hudson and a Dodge were also among the winners). Nash has shown initiative in bringing out its Metropolitan, a small economy car that is winning some favor.

But nevertheless the 1954 production figures for the independents involve tremendous cutbacks—in contrast to Ford and General Motors. In the first quarter these smaller manufacturers made less than thirty-seven per cent of the cars they produced the first three months of last year.

One explanation is that in harder times the giant corporations have considerable competitive advantages. They are much more able to shave prices, to permit bigger allowances on trade-ins and increase dealers' commissions. They have much vaster funds for promotion in local and national media. It is no accident that Buick and Cadillac have been built up into symbols of varying degrees of success.

All this tends to accentuate a decided trend which was not so discernible during the immediate postwar years when virtually all makes of new cars were at a premium. More mergers among the independents may be one result. But if the present rate continues, there will soon be really only two corporations in the field. What competition remains would be between them—and, as at present, among the various kinds of cars in each corporation stable. If that happens the American car buyer will have little check on whether he is getting his money's worth. Auto manufacturers' agreements are on the extensive side already—and when monopoly itself is but one step away. . . .

THE TAP ON THE WIRE

ALTHOUGH Attorney General Brownell has been pressing for a law to permit the use of wire-tap evidence in court proceedings, few Americans seem to be able to work up much positive enthusiasm for wire-tapping. Even the most vigorous advocates of legislation on the subject tend to talk of their proposals in terms of the lesser of two evils, placing major stress on the danger the nation faces from enemy agents, spies and saboteurs. In line with this approach, proponents of wire-tap legislation have lately taken to referring to such proposals as anti-treason measures, apparently in the hope of taking the curse off an unpopular idea.

As far as we are concerned, this popular reluctance to elevate the wire-tap to the status of a taken-for-granted national institution is a healthy sign. Whatever the pressing needs of the moment may be, there is something essentially repugnant to the American spirit about the idea of an anonymous governmental listener able to cut in on any and every conversation at will. From the unchecked wire-tap to search and seizure without a warrant does not seem to us a gigantic step.

When this matter came up for consideration recently, the House voted to insert a provision that the Attorney General must obtain approval by a Federal court prior to tapping wires for later use in court. On the face of it this safeguard seems to us eminently in keeping with this country's traditions, and we see no reason why this proviso should work any great hardship on Mr. Brownell or the FBI. To give the Attorney General complete discretion in a matter of this sort, without any checks or safeguards, would be opening the door to the gravest kind of abuse.

BAN ON SEGREGATION

AMERICAN Catholics are accustomed to thinking of Archbishop Robert E. Lucey of San Antonio as a leader in the field of Catholic social action. His interest over the years in such questions as the plight of migratory workers and his participation in the activities of organizations like the Catholic Association for International Peace have been well known. As a result, news that Archbishop Lucey has banned racial segregation in the Catholic schools of his Archdiocese is welcome but not surprising. Reports indicate that Archbishop Lucey began to experiment several years ago with Negro and white classes, and the recent order banning segregation completely is taken to indicate that the tests were satisfactory. A similar ruling has been in effect in St. Louis for some time, but this is believed to be the first such ban on segregation in the South proper. As such, it marks another distinct contribution by Archbishop Lucey.

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OUR PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY

By Chester Bowles

In mid-February, Chester Bowles circulated widely a private memorandum analyzing the implications of the New Look in our world foreign policy as announced by Secretary Dulles on January 12th of this year. On February 28th, an article by him, "A Plea for Another Great Debate," appeared in the New York Times Magazine, *calling for further clarification of the Dulles doctrine of "instant retaliation." Since then the new policy has been prominently questioned by many here and abroad, including Adlai Stevenson and the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson. Significant clarification has come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles, and the President. Mr. Bowles has now revised his original memorandum for publication in The Commonweal, with additions based on the various steps the Administration has recently taken to amplify and clarify Mr. Dulles' momentous speech.*

THE EDITORS.

MR. Dulles' January speech before the Council on Foreign Relations has been described as the "most important foreign policy speech since the new Administration took office." In it he announced a "basic decision" of far-reaching import. What is this decision? What are its implications? How does the "new" policy differ from our former policy?

Anyone who has had a personal share in the day-to-day workings of our foreign relations, even when limited to one country and one quarter of the globe, gains a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties facing any Administration in these critical years. It is not to add to these difficulties, but to assist, by thoughtful criticism, that we should all join in a discussion of this new policy.

All Americans, regardless of party, are agreed on our chief world objectives—a sound world security system, resistance to Communist expansion, adequate national defense, a world of peace with freedom and well-being for all. If after careful consideration some of us disagree with the new methods proposed to attain these aims, in the ensuing debate we must all remember to respect the patriotism and the good intentions of those with whom we differ. It is in this spirit that I write.

At the outset, it is important to determine the meaning of the new policy. Is it based on "atomic retaliation," as the speech seems to imply, or is it just an extension of the "limited war" concept?

One paragraph of Mr. Dulles' speech maintains that "local defense will always be important." And elsewhere a number of passages deal with the development of a strategic reserve and a highly mobile striking force. It seems to be implied that the components of this reserve or force will be ground and naval troops, perhaps armed with tactical atomic weapons. The reserve is to be established by "some withdrawal of land forces" in the Far East.

These passages of the speech suggest a policy still conceived in terms of resistance to aggression by more or less conventional forces and limited to the general area in which the aggression occurs. There is, to be sure, some suggestion, particularly in the passages on Korea and Indochina, that we would feel free to expand such fighting somewhat beyond the immediate point of attack.

These portions of the speech suggest that, if the "atomic retaliation" concept discussed below comes under pressure, the Administration may seek to place primary emphasis on these strategic-reserve mobile-striking force elements. Then the newness of the policy would

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The Former Ambassador to India Offers His Own Critique of the Dulles Doctrine of "Instant Retaliation" and of a "Purely Military" Approach

amount mainly to a bluff, a psychological warfare maneuver, similar to the "unleashing of the Chinese Nationalist Tiger on Formosa" a year ago.

That this shift in tactics should be dressed up in "atomic retaliation" talk holds out the danger that we will frighten our friends more than our enemies. More important, it places the Administration in the position of misleading the American people.

If in the final analysis the new policy does depend on the limited war concept, even with the new tactical weapons and mobile reserve, then how does the Administration's military budget, involving cuts in land and naval forces in favor of the Air Force, implement such a policy? Unless our policy is really the one of atomic retaliation it requires the maintenance of these "conventional" forces at high levels.



In recent press statements by the President and in Mr. Dulles' article in the April issue of *Foreign Affairs,* the above description seems to be emerging as the real meaning of the New Look. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that "massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation" could not "usefully be evoked under all circumstances," and he stressed that he had only talked of a *capacity* to use such retaliation, not of an intention to do so. Admirals Radford and Carney have emphasized that our new strategy does not mean dependence "on a single weapon or service." "Our program will retain a wide variety in the means and scope for responding to aggression," said Mr. Dulles.

If this is the full perspective, if the New Look is in fact not very new at all, then General Ridgway's admission to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was not satisfied with it, although he would try to make it work, becomes particularly relevant. Our Army chief added: "We are steadily reducing Army forces—a reduction through which our capabilities will be lowered while our responsibilities for meeting the continuing enemy threat have yet to be correspondingly lessened."

It may be that the reduction of our military forces is a calculated risk worth taking, but it must be seen as that and not as a cut-rate solution. The magic of the New Look, which is supposed to make it a budgetary bargain, then consists only in the possible "deterrent" effect of our capacity for atomic retaliation, the efficacy of which I discuss later in this article.

Regardless of the interpretation given to those portions of the Dulles speech dealing with local resistance, it remains true that the speech *as a whole* clearly looks toward de-emphasis of local action as a part of our world policy. "Local defense must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power," the Secretary of State said. In speaking of the need for reducing defense costs, he said, "This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less reliance on local defensive power."

This change in emphasis was adopted after the President and the National Security Council had made "some basic policy decisions," reported Mr. Dulles. "And the basic decision was *to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our own choosing.*" (Emphasis supplied.) These seem to be the key words in the speech. They are repeated twice in the course of a few paragraphs.

Do not these words mean strategic atom bombing of urban targets in China and Russia? The words "instant retaliation" have always been associated with atomic bombing. Coming as they do in this speech, in contrast to conventional resistance within the area of aggression, the usual connotation is strengthened.

Since the area of aggression is the place of the aggressor's choosing, the places of our own choosing must be beyond that area, presumably within Russia and/or China. The principal targets suitable for atomic attack in those countries are, of course, the large urban industrial concentrations of population.

This conclusion is fortified by an argument Mr. Dulles stressed. Under the old policy, he said, "we needed to be ready to fight in the arctic and in the tropics; in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by sea, by land and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons." Under the new policy, he assured us, the planning burden would be less, and it would be possible to get "more security at less cost."

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Troop withdrawal may mean an "invitation to aggression"

BEFORE turning to what seems to me to be the weaknesses of the new policy itself, it is important to examine some of the assumptions underlying the Secretary's position. The first of these is that the former policy involved the stationing of American ground troops along the entire periphery of the Communist world ready to participate in the defense of that boundary. Whatever the defects of our former policy, this characterization is wholly inaccurate. There has been no such "thin red line" of American forces.

Our troops have been stationed in substantial numbers only in Korea, Japan and Germany. As to Korea, the policy has always contemplated the withdrawal of such troops as were not needed to maintain the security of that area. This policy was implemented in 1949, upon the recommendation of the then Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, by the withdrawal of all American troops stationed there.

Troops were returned only when, in their absence, Korea was invaded. The presently announced withdrawals are then no more than a continuation of that policy announced in Secretary Acheson's much discussed and distorted "invitation to aggression" in Korea.

As to Japan, presumably we intend to maintain ground forces there, as provided in the peace treaty, until the Japanese are fully capable of their own defense. Similarly, it is inconceivable that the Administration would evacuate U. S. troops from Europe under any foreseeable circumstances in the near future.

In other words, far from being scattered thinly over the world, our troops now abroad have been concentrated in areas of vital strategic importance which we cannot abandon. If reduction of these forces is carried out this will certainly not imply a reduction of our *commitments* in the areas where they are stationed; it will simply mean that it may be more difficult to make those commitments effective.

The second misconception is that the planning burden imposed by the former policy is a staggering one because we had to be prepared to fight anywhere in the world and by any means. The fact is that the places where Communist aggression could occur in any other context than as the outbreak of World War III are extremely limited. They run principally along the southern border of Red China and into the Middle East.

Without disparaging the complexity of the strategic and planning problems set by these possibilities, it is quite clear that they are not limitless. On the contrary, they are well within the capacity of any competent general staff. Indeed, plans for operations in those areas must in any event be in preparation and under constant review, for they would undoubtedly be involved in any general war which might break out.

The third basic misconception concerns the reason why some of our postwar policies seemed to be only reactions to conditions set by the Communists. As examples, Mr. Dulles cites the intervention in Korea, the European aid program, and the military build-up beginning in 1950.

To begin with the third of these, the decision to embark on a new expansion of military strength was actually taken before the outbreak in Korea, to be exact, in April of 1950. The Korean fighting forced us sharply to accelerate the tempo at which that decision was implemented. The decision was required because we had demobilized at a frenzied pace after World War II, set an arbitrary budget ceiling on military expenditures, and relied almost exclusively on the deterrent of the atomic bomb, of which we then had a monopoly, to fend off aggression.

These same considerations led to our withdrawal of ground forces from Korea in 1948. We returned, in part, to retrieve an error into which our earlier bipartisan preoccupation with atomic deterrence and low over-all military costs had led us. The very posture in which these policies put us made it *impossible* to respond in a "manner of our own choosing," for the only other manner we had available was atomic bombing, which carried with it the near certainty of general war.

Finally, as to the European aid program, it was apparent in the closing months of World War II that the task of economic reconstruction after the war would be enormous and would have to be financed largely out of funds furnished by the United States. The decision to do this was taken at that time. This program was undertaken not in reaction to any Soviet moves but to the facts of a situation which was completely unprecedented and required decisions and solutions of an equally novel character.

By 1947 our experience in France, Italy and other countries led us to the conclusion that a much larger scale effort on our part was necessary. Some of this additional effort was made necessary by an unexpected and effective Soviet Cold War reaction to the situation that *we* had created by underwriting the economic reconstruction of Europe. To have abandoned that effort in the face of Russian pressure would have been to abandon one of the most important initiatives of the postwar years.

From the three experiences Mr. Dulles cites we learn, first of all, that under-armament in conventional forces and over-dependence on atomic deterrent power are not satisfactory answers to the strategic situation we face. The military reactions which Mr. Dulles mentions each derive from a basic policy not essentially different from the one he now urges us to re-embrace. Secondly, and more broadly, in each of these cases there was

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a dangerous major underestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the flexibility of the alternatives open to it.

Soviet Policy Today

IF we are to avoid again falling into this same error of underestimating Soviet potential, we must take a hard, unemotional look at the policies which the Communists are today pursuing or seem likely to pursue.

To begin with, they are continuing to maintain and improve the largest military force in the world. Their land armies are substantially undiminished from the figure at which they stood following World War II. A large portion of these forces are maintained beyond the borders of Russia on the frontiers of the non-Communist world. There is no reason to doubt the substantial loyalty, the fighting qualities, the equipment or the organization of these troops.

The Russian air force is larger than our own. It is probably as fully modernized, and contains a larger proportion of jet planes which, on the record of their performance in Korea, are not decisively inferior in capabilities, armament or operation to the best we have in combat.

At the same time, Russia has, by the delivery of military supplies and equipment, by providing staff and technical advice, by assisting in training, and in some instances by outright assumption of command, been strengthening and toughening the forces of the satellite states and of China. The performance of North Korean and Chinese troops in the Korean War bears testimony to the effectiveness of this effort.

The formidable scientific development which led to Communist mastery of the atom and hydrogen bombs years before the most pessimistic Western predictions is being pressed forward with vigor. It is safe to assume that Russia already has an atomic stockpile which, if smaller than our own, is still capable of wreaking vast havoc on our cities and those of our allies.

Atomic expenditures have been stepped up in this year's Soviet budget. In the field of guided missiles there is reason to believe that Russian development is already superior to our own. As for the future, the Soviet Union is said to have a larger number of scientists and engineers than the United States, and is graduating one-third more a year than we do.

Aside from these *military* features of its policy, there are signs of an awakening recognition on the part of the Kremlin of the possibilities of *economic* programs in pursuit of its goals. It is significant, for example, that the last two Soviet ambassadors to India have been a foreign trade official and an agricultural expert.

So far, the Russians seem to have confined their technical assistance activity to countries within the Communist bloc. In China and North Korea, if we are to believe their announcements, their contributions have been impressive, though there is no way of knowing what economic concessions have been exacted in return, and thus what the net contribution actually is.

Soviet and Chinese traders and goods are appearing on world markets in steadily increasing quantities, and with terms that are increasingly tempting. Proposals such as the China-Ceylon rice-for-rubber deal are difficult for a new and struggling country to resist. As this kind of pressure grows, the number of takers may grow too, and with it the ties of the non-Communist economies, particularly in Asia, to the economy of the Soviet world.

In the field of Communist propaganda as well, there are signs of intensification of effort and a shrewd shift in tactics. In the last few years the virulent Moscow-based hate-America campaign has been quite successful in undermining confidence in the United States. It has been notably *ineffective,* however, in increasing confidence in Russia.

Now, new propaganda techniques, based largely on skillfully organized personal contacts, are beginning to be evident in all parts of the world. Many more students from non-Communist countries in Europe and Asia, by no means all of them Party members, are being invited to study in the Soviet Union and China. Carefully indoctrinated groups of Russian and Chinese athletes, opera stars, actors, ballerinas, musicians, acrobats are starting on tour beyond the Iron Curtain.

In addition, the Kremlin has under its direction the powerful forces of local Communist parties in most of the countries about which we are most concerned. Not only do these local Communists provide the best possible vehicle for Soviet propaganda, but they can be the key to Communist success in war or in peace-time expansion by internal revolution. Thus not only do they aid the Kremlin, but the Kremlin gears its policy to aid them.

Finally, the Communist high command is supporting this whole broad effort with a calculating diplomatic offensive of extraordinary skill and resourcefulness. Although Communism is ideologically committed to the eternal enmity of its system with ours, the Soviet diplomats do not assume the monolithic unity of the non-Communist world. Instead they combine force, threats, propaganda, persuasion, and negotiation in an unceasing effort to probe and exploit the tensions, weaknesses and divergent interests among the non-Communist countries.

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This brief sketch of the developing Soviet policy as it shapes up to many observers shows it to be a highly flexible and imaginative one, avoiding many of the mistakes of the Stalinist era. There is nothing in it, certainly, to lead to the conclusion that Soviet determination, opportunities, or capacities have declined since January 20, 1953. It should be noted that this policy is based on an economy already one-third the size of our own, which is expanding by approximately ten billion dollars annually; a rate of eight per cent, or double our own yearly growth. The Soviet economy is already strong enough, in the eyes of Russian planners, to warrant additional emphasis on the production of consumer goods for use in Russia, besides carrying the formidable burden of steadily increasing the foreign policy commitments outlined above.

The Military Aspect

HOW does the new policy laid down by the Administration measure up to the challenge embodied in the Soviet policy sketched above? It is useful, first, to consider the policy of atomic retaliation on its own terms as a military policy designed to deter aggression and repel it if it should break out.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that the most important feature of the policy is its *deterrent* effect. He speaks of "more reliance on deterrent power," "the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power" "the way to deter aggression," and the like. Thus the policy must first be judged on its practicality as a deterrent.

The important thing about strategic bombing of Russian or Chinese cities beyond any area of immediate aggression is that such action carries with it the near certainty of precipitating a general war. With it come all the consequences of such a war, including counter-retaliation upon our own cities by atomic attack, which, our military experts warn us, must, even with the best defense, be partially successful.

The threat of "instant retaliation" against aggression, then, can be effective to deter aggression only if it is clear that we as a people are willing to accept the risks and consequences which such retaliation would entail. As far as Europe is concerned, such a willingness on our part is clear. Through the painful lessons of two world wars, we have come to regard an attack on Europe as an attack on ourselves, and we are prepared to repel it at any risk, including that of general war. This concept, indeed, is one of the solemn obligations written into the North Atlantic Treaty.

Because all this has been so clear to us and the Russians, the policy of threatened atomic retaliation—which has been in effect as to Europe since the end of World War II—appears in fact to have deterred aggression there. Thus regarding Europe the new policy is not at all new. It is new only as applied to Asia.

But is it as clear that we as a people would be willing to accept the risks and consequences of a general war to repel a local aggression in Asia—say in Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal or Iran? Our national reaction to Korea *underscores* our unwillingness.

Yet the logic of the new policy, and the military and budgetary arrangements to back it up, reduce our alternatives in the face of such aggression to two: (1) atomic retaliation with its seemingly unacceptable risks, or (2) limited local response but with insufficient forces.

Since the Russians are as able as we are to calculate that we will not adopt the first alternative, will we not invite, rather than deter local Asian aggressions by our emphasis on atomic retaliation? Indeed, is not this invitation made almost explicit by Mr. Dulles's hope that the new policy will prevent *"such aggressions as would mean general war."* (Emphasis supplied.)

In his explanatory article, Mr. Dulles has further emphasized that the new policy "does not mean turning every local war into a world war." As for the threat of instant retaliation, he reminds us that, "In no place did I say we *would* retaliate instantly." Far from providing a clear-cut choice to the Communists, this seems to encourage a guessing game. Only if the Communists guess that we would actually use our capacity for atomic retaliation can it be described as a deterrent.

How are the Communists to decide just which aggressions "would mean general war"? They may miscalculate, and in the event we may prove ready for atomic retaliation and general war, but then it will be too late for all of us. Does the new policy not thus tempt the Communists to miscalculate?

On the other hand, what happens if the Communists do risk a minor invasion, for example of Bhutan, a small kingdom between India and Tibet, and their calculation that we will not risk general war over this proves correct? If we once let them call our bluff, does not much of any deterrent value of the policy disappear overnight?

At present their losses in Korea may well have taught the Communists not to attempt further direct military aggression. Does not the new policy, by encouraging

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them to think that they might "get away" with an aggression that would not mean general war, endanger the lasting effect of our successful defense of Korea?

(As a footnote here, it is interesting to question what efforts the Administration is making through the development of continental and civilian defense to minimize the inevitable consequences of atomic counter-retaliation and thus make the risks of the new policy somewhat less staggering. Apparently the new budgetary provisions for these items, while somewhat larger than in the past, still fall far short of the minimum amounts which responsible authorities deem necessary.)

If the new policy will not, and indeed is not intended to, deter such aggression as will *not* lead to general war, we may next ask whether it will repel such aggression once it has broken out.

For this, we can only analyze a suppositious case. There is a remote possibility that in case of some types of atomic attack against China the Soviet Union might decide to wait and see, instead of promptly honoring her commitment under the Chinese-Soviet Alliance. If that happened, our retaliation presumably would not lead to World War III, but simply to a full-blown war with China.

Is there any reason to suppose, however, that it would be decisive in forcing China to end its aggression? China is not nearly so vulnerable as are Western nations to atomic attack. It is a decentralized country, with few significant concentrations. Its transport and communications networks are primitive. Its armies are schooled in guerrilla warfare, in living off the land without benefit of the elaborate supply and supporting formations which we find necessary.

Would not atomic attack on China, in the unlikely event that it did not result in general war, lead to a prolonged, sprawling, indecisive conflict? Would it not be likely that even if Russia did not openly enter such a war, she would go all out in supplying China with war materials, perhaps even including atomic bombs and bombers for possible attacks on the vulnerable targets of the American mainland? In any case, if our atomic power does destroy China's cities, what is to stop her main asset, manpower, from over-running the rest of continental Asia?

These considerations indicate that a strategy based on atomic retaliation neither adequately deters nor adequately defeats aggressions in Asia. This conclusion is also suggested by the Administration's own military advisers, who have frequently warned against excessive dependence upon atomic air power for all situations.

On September 19, 1953, Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson stated: "The increasing power of the atomic bomb suggests to me that the need for improvement of the more conventional forms of warfare may well become greater than less, as we approach absoluteness in mass destructive weapons . . . . I say simply that we must be prepared for any kind of war, and that we must not allow our fascination with particular weapons, no matter how bizarre, to obscure the fact that . . . the strategy chooses the weapon, not vice-versa."

The President's National Security Training Commission on December 1, 1953, reported to the President: "The ultimate factor is man—not the A-bomb."

Only two months before Mr. Dulles' speech, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, declared: "The ultimate stake in wars is the control of bits of this earth's surface and of the people who inhabit them. It may be that at some distant date this control can be exercised by a threat from sea or sky alone, but it would be a dangerous and perhaps even fatal fallacy, to conclude in 1953 that this date has arrived." Has the danger disappeared in 1954?

There is another area in which the weakness of the new policy as a military policy is overwhelmingly apparent. In the case of China itself, Communist conquest of the country was achieved not by "aggression" in any formal sense, but by locally organized and trained guerrilla armies. These armies were no doubt in part supplied and assisted by the Russians, but at no time were any number of Russian troops engaged in the fighting. Yet the loss of China by these means was certainly as great a disaster for the free world as if that loss had occurred as a result of a Russian invasion. In Asia such internal revolutions and civil wars are at least as important factors as external aggression.

These same methods are at work now in Indochina, and give every prospect of achieving at least a measure of success for the Communist cause. Communist control of that country would be a strategic disaster, for it would put the rice bowl of Asia in Communist hands and result in terrible pressure against the remaining free Asia. All of this could occur without one Communist soldier moving across an existing boundary line.

How does the new policy offer any practical means of dealing with this critical situation? Atomic retaliation has not been considered, and the President has hastened to state that he could conceive of no greater tragedy than the commitment of American ground troops to an all-out war in Indochina.

This reaction demonstrates that not only is the new military policy insufficient, but also that *no purely military policy can hold out hope for a solution in a situation like Indochina.* Secretary Dulles has himself clearly recognized the connection between the military

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and the political problems in his March 29th speech on Asia. His first point was the importance of granting the long delayed full independence to the people of Indochina without which they cannot be expected to resist wholeheartedly the expansion of Ho Chi Minh's Communists. To this fundamental problem we will return later.

Implications

THUS far we have raised serious questions about whether the Administration's policy, as a military policy, will deter and repel aggression. We may now turn to the question whether it will not in fact have other, and clearly undesirable, results.

First of all, what are the likely consequences for our European alliance which, as Mr. Dulles recognizes, continues to be the crucial element in all our defense plans? Keeping such an alliance afloat and supplying it with leadership are among the most delicate of diplomatic problems. So far, although we have been generally successful in this effort, the principal criticism directed against us has come from the belief, prevalent in many vulnerable European countries, that we are somewhat too ready to accept the risks of an all-out war.

These criticisms have not been substantial enough to impede the major work of the alliance. Now, however, without any apparent consultation with our allies, we seem to be adopting a policy which threatens general atomic war in return for any aggression, anywhere in the world.

It is pertinent to ask, first, whether our European allies will support such a concept. Not the least of the reasons is that our own "atomic retaliation" may be based on the territories of some of these allies. But the question is not merely one of the blunt refusal to go along, but of a more subtle corrosion of the spirit of cooperation and acceptance of American leadership which can seriously hinder what is after all the main work of the European alliance, the cooperative development of the defenses of Western Europe.

Another significant problem also connected with our position in the eyes of other non-Communist nations, is where the new policy leaves us on the issue of international atomic control. One of the principal reasons why we have been able to retain the confidence of the governments and people of Europe and free Asia has been our wholehearted efforts to secure a workable arrangement for the international limitation of atomic warfare. The heartfelt response throughout the world to President Eisenhower's recent atomic proposal is evidence of this feeling. But if we are to shift to an ever heavier reliance upon atomic weapons in our defense plans, can we continue with the same good faith to work for international atomic disarmament?

The new policy also has serious consequences for our own form of government. Under the Constitution, Congress, and Congress alone, has the power to declare war. This is our ultimate assurance that the awful power to put the nation's life at issue will be exercised only after deliberation and with the probability that it reflects a truly popular will.

Of course, the President, as Commander in Chief, has always had wide authority to deploy our armed forces and even to commit them to battle. It has become clear that the President can, in the exercise of that power, create a situation where the declaration of war by Congress becomes a mere formality. This possibility was at the heart of the debate on troops to Europe in 1949.

But while this has always been a possibility, we have never before adopted a policy in advance which turns this possibility into a likelihood. The policy announced by Secretary Dulles comes perilously close to doing exactly that.

The President has logically argued that in an attack on the United States he would have the Constitutional duty to order immediate retaliation even before convening Congress, and that under our NATO obligations he must consider an attack on our European allies as an attack on the United States. But this only shows that the place where the doctrine of instant retaliation is really a new doctrine is *Asia,* and no one has yet explained how it will apply there.

If Chinese troops invade, say, Burma, will the President consult with Congress before he launches a retaliatory attack on China itself? If so, how can the retaliation be called "instant"? If he takes time to consult Congress does he not forfeit the important advantage of surprise, and run the risk that the Communists will anticipate us by delivering a savage atomic attack of their own on American cities? Or will he act on his own authority and start or invite World War III without giving Congress an opportunity to exercise the responsibility which by the Constitution belongs to it alone? The Constitutional relations between the executive and Congress on this question have never been taken lightly in the past.

Finally, there is a basic moral issue posed by the new policy to which we, of all people, should not be callously indifferent. We speak of ourselves as a religious people, and pride ourselves on our democratic faith in the worth of the individual. It is by these beliefs that we distinguish our way of life from that of the Communists whom we oppose.

Yet we are now, almost casually, proposing to immolate millions of non-combatant men, women and

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children, in retaliation for an aggression launched by rulers over whom they have admittedly little control. Moreover, if these attacks are directed at Chinese cities, they will hit targets which comprise some of the most concentrated population areas in the world, and are substantially devoid of military targets.

It is awful enough to contemplate the use of strategic atomic bombing in a war in which we have been attacked or in which our national existence is clearly at stake. It is quite a different matter to plan to use this frightful weapon when these factors are not present, and when lesser means might equally serve our ends.

This again links up with the problem of our standing before the peoples of the world, particularly in Asia. Communist propaganda has already convinced hundreds of millions of these people that we dropped the atomic bomb on Japan and not Germany because the Japanese, as Asians, were inferior people. Atomic bombing of defenseless Chinese cities, even while leaving Russian cities untouched, will, unless the provocation is overwhelmingly clear, turn all Asia into our bitter, unrelenting enemies.

Thus the new strategy of increased reliance on the atomic bomb encourages a "go-it-alone" attitude on our part, and alienates our friends and allies from us. It may lead us to the chilly isolation of Mr. Hoover's "fortress America"; it is remarkably similar to the strategic concepts of Mr. Taft. Both these courses were supposedly rejected by the American people, and by both political parties as recently as their 1952 conventions. Instead of giving us "more security at less cost," the new policy, even in strategic terms, seems to give less security at the cost of damaging the vital unity of the non-Communist world so painfully constructed during the last ten years.

Non-Military Aspects

A ROUNDED world policy for the United States, adequate "for the long haul," must include several fundamental elements.

First, of course, is the matter of sufficient military strength, in conjunction with our allies in Europe and elsewhere, to discourage Soviet attack and to give a reasonable prospect of victory if a war should develop. Thus far we have analyzed some of the inadequacies of Mr. Dulles's new policy to provide this kind of military shield.

Protection against aggression, however, should be the beginning and not the end of our foreign policy. Behind the shield erected by our military forces and alliances, we must, I believe, be working for the following goals:

1. The economic and political strengthening of non-Communist but not *necessarily* pro-Western nations, throughout the world so that they may become confident of their own ability, not only to survive, but to defend themselves.

2. The gradual development of a free, economically healthy world-wide community, sufficiently broad and united to turn the balance of power decisively against the Soviet Union, and over a period of time to induce a settlement which will allow all nations to develop in their own way without fear of interference.

It is precisely in these areas where our present approach is inadequate almost to the point of non-existence, and indeed where our policies approach paralysis. In the very regions where we should be working toward these fundamentals, we find that American prestige is now at a dangerously low ebb. This condition exists not only in Asia and in Africa, but in the countries of Europe which are so important to our present plans for military security.

In Asia, however, the problem takes on a special intensity because of the fact that most of the non-Communist nations there have made it clear that they do not intend to become involved in any East-West struggle, cold or hot. Although all of these nations are committed to getting rid and staying rid of foreign domination, and many of them are devoted to free institutions, they tend to view the West with a suspicion born of long and painful colonial experience. Most of all they want to be left alone to concentrate their energies on the vast problems of political and economic development that press within their own borders, much as we ourselves did in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This attitude clearly does not face the facts of the Soviet threat and naturally we find it exasperating. But, like it or not, it is a hard fact which must be faced thoughtfully and patiently.

Stability and indigenous strength in what remains of free Asia can only be established by the will of the people themselves. We can best contribute effectively to this stability by working wholeheartedly for vigorous, healthy governments, capable of defending their own interests against all efforts at outside domination, including our own.

This policy involves the abandonment of the inherently arrogant view that "anyone who is not for us is against us." It requires a strong, consistent position against vestigial colonialism wherever it exists in today's world. It requires a refusal to base our Asian policy on discredited regimes simply because they are willing to put their divisions at our disposal in the event of

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World War III, a war that some of these regimes appear to be itching to start.

The course I suggest involves a decisively increased emphasis on Point Four and other economic aid in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America, without political strings attached. It requires a well-planned and carefully executed information program adequately supported both by funds and by the moral backing of the Administration. And, finally, it calls for a flexible, diplomatic posture which recognizes the importance and the interests of other nations, even when they disagree with us, and which demonstrates imagination in the cause of reduction of international tension.

On all of these essential points, not only Mr. Dulles's speech, but also the other statements and action of the Administration, are brief to the point of disavowal.

In North Africa and elsewhere we find ourselves ranged in support of French colonial power without, as yet, even being able to show any tangible benefits in terms of French support of our European Army policy.

Point Four received exactly one half of one sentence (seven words) in Mr. Dulles's speech. And in the sentence which followed he said, "Foreign budgetary aid is being limited to situations where it clearly contributes to military strength." On this ground we did not even permit the UN to start its proposed Fund for Economic Development on a shoe-string basis.

Our information program is being cut and narrowed.

For the rest, Mr. Dulles counsels reliance on "conduct and example [which] shall continue as in the past to show all men how good can be the fruits of freedom." One can be pardoned for asking whether this is really adequate to the world in which we live.

The Contrast

WHEN we place side by side the Soviet and American policies which we have sketched briefly above, the result is certainly enough to give us pause. In the face of vigorous military expansion in *all* branches of armament, Mr. Dulles proposes retrenchment in our defense forces, and increasing dependence upon a single kind of military force which, in Asian conditions, may be particularly indecisive. In the face of continuing Soviet military assistance to the satellite nations and China, Mr. Dulles offers sharply reduced and limited contributions to the defense efforts of our allies. In the face of a new grasp by the Soviets of the importance of economic assistance, and increasing aid to China's development, Mr. Dulles comes up with reduced economic assistance and a bare half-hearted acceptance of Point Four. In the face of what begins to look like aggressive trade war, the Administration's Randall report settles for minor changes in what is an admittedly restrictive trade policy insulating American markets from the goods of our friends. In the face of heightened and more subtle propaganda programs, our own information effort is being narrowed and cut back. And in the face of an adroit and flexible diplomatic offensive designed to split apart the non-Communist world, we interpose our hardening dogmatisms about the impossibility of driving a wedge between Russia and China, and demonstrate an increasing indifference to the opinion of mankind.

It is difficult to see how this adds up to anything but a policy of negation that leaves us exposed on most of the fronts—and they may well be the most important fronts—of the cold war. On which of these fronts can the Administration say, in all honesty, that it has captured the "initiative"? Have we not instead steadily retreated, and in several areas, simply forfeited the contest?

The Price

THE principal justification for what appears to be wholesale withdrawal from the real conflict is that we may thereby save some four to five billions of dollars annually, and thus avoid undertaking commitments "beyond [our] strength, so that [we] come to practical bankruptcy." Mr. Dulles quotes these words from Lenin.

Of course real bankruptcy, in the sense that the economy would collapse under the strain of meeting the commitments placed upon it, must be avoided. But how can any responsible person say that we have come even close to that point?

Do we seriously believe that our three hundred and fifty billion dollar economy can afford no more than ten per cent of our annual income "over the long haul" to assure our security and the continued existence of the ideas by which we live? Is a country whose steel industry is running at sixty-five per cent of capacity, which has unmanageable agricultural surpluses, in which three million, seven hundred thousand people

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are unemployed, is such a country anywhere near bankruptcy in any real sense?

The bankruptcy which Lenin talked about cannot be *economic* bankruptcy, for that is impossible in a society as productive as ours. Could it be that Lenin meant a bankruptcy of *will,* a failure of nerve and purpose which would lead us to slough off the essential burdens of maintaining a free way of life?

Disturbingly enough, this seems to be the very kind of bankruptcy that the Administration attributes to the people of this country by its own reluctance to call upon them even for the mild sacrifices which are necessary for an effective foreign and defense policy in the present age of crisis.

In Secretary Dulles's reasoned article in April *Foreign Affairs* some of the sharp edges of my questions concerning the New Look have been taken off, by a new and more comprehensive fitting for the New Look. Still, an increased reliance on the military, and on the great bombs, remains as the clear trend of our policy.

We can agree with Mr. Dulles that there rests on us "the threefold task of providing insurance against another world war, of demonstrating the good fruits of freedom which undermine the rule of despots by contrast; and of providing a major part of the effort required for the healthy growth of underdeveloped areas."

But by these very tests, our policies seem woefully inadequate. It is not easy to understand why Mr. Dulles believes that, "Another consequence of our new policies is that it has become practicable to reduce our economic aid to our allies." His third task of aiding in the development of underdeveloped areas seems to conflict with the announcement that "broadly speaking, economic aid in the form of grants is on its way out as a major element of our foreign policy." Nothing yet, certainly not the Randall Report, presents any satisfactory alternative.

Thus one can conclude, as the New York *Times* did on March 21 after reviewing several weeks of debate on the New Look, that "the Administration's explanations still left many questions unanswered," and that "abroad at least the 'New Look'—coming on top of McCarthyism, the cutbacks in economic and Point Four aid, the new developments in hydrogen and atom weapons—would continue to inspire fear and uncertainty about American leadership."

THE STAGE

THREE MUSICALS

"THE Golden Apple," a new musical by John Latouche and Jerome Moross, has given more pleasure than any comparable event of the season: for which blessing, indeed, much thanks. These various pleasures are largely those of the eye and the intellect, for it would be my guess that Mr. Moross' score, despite its artful use of regional American musical patois, is too tepid and mannered to sustain much intensive inspection. But at every point in this unqualified success (sponsored again by the admirable Phoenix Theater) the eye is solicited by the handsome draftsmanship of William and Jean Eckart's decor, the quite first-rate choreography of Hanya Holm, and the consistently engaging freshness of the stage picture.

It is, however, upon Mr. Latouche's book that "The Golden Apple" so solidly rests. This composition—a rearrangement of incidents from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in terms of American folk art—seems to me a model of its kind. Altogether winning in its tactful wit and playful imagination, it displays a charm of spirit I can recall in only one other contemporary musical: Kurt Weill's "Love Life." The correspondence Mr. Latouche has contrived between the Greek legends and his American fable are always clever, sometimes dazzling: particularly in a languorous South Seas version of the Siren Song, and an apposite ditty which contemplates cosmic disaster gleefully, is the satiric intention beautifully achieved.

Excellent, too, is the production—the wry, randy fancies of Bibi Osterwald, Kaye Ballard and Portia Nelson serving as a perfect foil for the sweet sobriety of Patricia Gillette and Stephen Douglass. And who would resist Jack Whiting's easy soft-shoe routine? Irresistible, indeed, seems to me the precise word for "The Golden Apple." I cannot imagine anyone so morose or ill-tempered, so insensitive to quality and taste, as not to enjoy it. (*At the Alvin.*)

TO "The Girl in Pink Tights" (*at the Mark Hellinger*) and "By the Beautiful Sea" (*at the Majestic*) I find myself—on the contrary—sympathetic but diffident: one might almost say indifferent. They are facts in a season, not experiences: large, opulent, inescapable facts, but leaving nonetheless in the mind a flavor which is bland and without distinction. Each invokes a period rich in theatrical detail—Coney Island at the turn of the century, the New York of Castle Garden and the elevated railway—only to retreat quixotically and refuse to exploit it. The failure would

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seem to be one of imagination rather than will: about each of these musical events hangs the melancholy air of what-might-have-been, the last shredded remnants of that joyous alcoholic haze in which someone must have announced (probably about two a.m.): "Wouldn't it be wonderful to make a musical about Coney Island with Shirley Booth?" And yes, everyone said it *would* be wonderful, but somewhere along the line—after the hangovers and the bromo-seltzers, the contracts and the auditions, the backers and the angels—someone had to sit down and face the malignant, blank keys of the piano, the intractable flatulence of a fictional bubble which will never rise. What does one do with so stubborn a bubble? Puncture it? But consider the bookings, the advance sale, the theater parties hot on your trail. No, one never punctures: one grins and bears it, rehearses, replaces, elides, amends, substitutes, hides, fires, and then opens cold in Boston.

Apart from their mutual insufficiencies, the common ground on which "The Girl in Pink Tights" and "By the Beautiful Sea" meet is their desperate dependence on a central personality. The latter has Mielziner's ingenious stage effects (a murky tunnel of love, a spiraling roller-coaster), vivid coloring, a facile score, the exhilaration of Mae Barnes, but it falls to Miss Booth to give it her warmth and wistful tenderness, her slightly raffish *bonhomie*. It is largely to her very existence, rather than her art, to which we pay tribute in this production, but one realizes again to how deep a need in the American temperament she responds.

"The Girl in Pink Tights" is visually grand, dull, ultimately inconsequential. Miss DeMille's choreography is, however, masterly, and the entire production is justified by the electric presence of the French dancer, Jeanmaire. The word this season is, I believe, "gamin," and Jeanmaire—with her zest and elegance, her guileful innocence and demure sophistication, her eccentric beauty and wailing, Piaf-like voice—is its supreme embodiment. She is, without qualification, one of the great personalities of the contemporary stage, and I can think of no more brilliant exemplar than she of that essential magic—so rare, so lovely—which is the only justification of theater, and the experience of which is our only reward, our permanent hope.

RICHARD HAYES.

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THE SCREEN

BIG AND MONKEY BUSINESS

PRODUCER John Houseman, who has shown before that he knows how to make movies ("Julius Caesar," "The Bad and the Beautiful") was smart to gather such a starry cast for his production of "Executive Suite." Since the picture's subject matter (big business and the election of a new president for a corporation) is rather forbidding to most audiences, the stars will attract moviegoers and once in the theater, they will find that Houseman has fashioned his unlikely material into absorbing cinema. It is this use of stars, however, that detracts somewhat from the story's suspense, for it is too much of a sure thing that of the five vice-presidents contending for the top job, the young, handsome, energetic one who loves his wife and son and baseball will get it. Nevertheless the picture does throw in an added suspense gimmick: even though this pleasant, clean-cut vice-president is played by William Holden, his wife (June Allyson) doesn't

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want him to have the job; she wants him to keep his high ideals and continue working as a designer. But Holden thinks he has a calling, and thinks he can be right *and* be president. At the end, Barbara Stanwyck, as the principal stockholder, assures Miss Allyson that although she will be lonely her husband will one day come back to his family.

In spite of the fact that the characters in "Executive Suite" are more often types than real people and that there are moments when one gets lost in the details of stock trading and big business, it is on the whole entirely engrossing. Ernest Lehman wrote a bright and lively script which successfully condenses the lengthy novel by Cameron Hawley, and Robert Wise has directed this cast so that every sequence is revealing and necessary to the whole.

Although types, the vice-presidents are by no means dull to watch: Walter Pidgeon as the tired senior officer, Dean Jagger as the old-school production boss, Paul Douglas as the vice-president in charge of sales—a sort of a "Death of a Salesman" type complete with mistress (Shelley Winters), and Fredric March as the controller who is only interested in profits and loss—and becoming president of the corporation.

At the big board of directors meeting, the battle is joined between March (giving one of the finest performances of his career), who hopes to have stock broker Louis Calhern, Paul Douglas and Barbara Stanwyck behind him, and William Holden, who has at first only Walter Pidgeon and his own high ideals to back him up. One flaw in the picture is its failure to give us a real build-up for the fine speech in which Holden sways the group. However, he plays the role well—although top acting honors must go to Fredric March for his taut portrait of vicious greed and to Nina Foch for her intense performance as the dead president's grief-stricken secretary.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG.

AN APPEAL

Through a misunderstanding, The Commonweal recently stated that a hospital in Bombay, operated by the Medical Mission Sisters, was to be made "the largest . . . in all India." Mother Anna Dengel, superior of the congregation, has informed us that while they do have a hospital in Bombay, it is a small one, and there are no plans at present for any expansion on such a scale. She tells us, however, that the Sisters are building a 250-bed hospital in New Delhi, a city seriously in need of additional hospital facilities. The Sisters need $100,000 to complete construction, and would be particularly grateful for the donation, as memorials, of rooms at a cost of $1,500 each. But any donations would be very welcome. (Medical Mission Sisters, 8400 Pine Road, Fox Chase, Philadelphia 11, Pa.)

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Every Relationship Between God and Man But One

LETTERS TO MILENA. By Franz Kafka. Schocken Books. $3.75.

THE CASTLE. By Franz Kafka, with an homage by Thomas Mann. Knopf. $4.50.

By ANNE FREMANTLE

THE Milena of these letters came from an old Czech family. She first met Franz Kafka in 1920, when she was translating some of his early short stories into Czech. "I can't remember your face in precise detail," Kafka wrote her after their first meeting, "only how you finally walked away." During the next two years (probably—for none of the letters are dated) they wrote to each other constantly. Milena was twenty-four, uneasily married. Kafka was thirty-eight, and had been three times engaged. Milena was not a Jew; Kafka was, and in many of his letters he is concerned with his first emotional contact with a *goyah,* and with explaining his Jewishness to her. Mr. Willy Haas, who has expurgated from these letters almost all references to living persons, including himself, with a thoroughness whose necessity he, as editor, officially regrets, has left in "almost all passages referring to Judaism." The deleted passages have not been marked; but, as it were to compensate for such cuts, in the new Knopf edition of *The Castle* we are given about a fourth more than existed in any previously printed text: two entirely new chapters and many long and interesting alternates and concluding sections —that to Chapter xviii being particularly valuable.

None of Milena's letters have survived: Kafka mentions having destroyed some, returned others. Their relationship grew, matured, ripened and rotted, on paper. They met twice as lovers. Once, idyllically, near Vienna, where "a sick man is promised three months vacation, and is given four days, and of Tuesday and Sunday only a piece and even the evenings and mornings have been cut off!" Their second meeting, at Gmunden, ratified the dissolution of their intimacy. But their relationship, however agonizing, was never static, and never imaginary; on the contrary, it was painfully real: *"You belong to me,"* Kafka wrote Milena, "even if I were never to see you again." And, "I do love you, you stupid one, as the sea loves the pebble in its depth, this is just how my love engulfs you." But in spite of this concrete acceptance, even in Vienna, Kafka had no illusions about their love. "When we talked about it briefly, I had the feeling that we were searching for someone whom we knew very well and missed very much, and whom we were therefore calling by the most lovely names, but there was no answer." Later he wrote: "Few things are certain, but this is one of them. We shall never live together, in the same apartment, body to body, at the same table, not ever in the same town." Really to communicate with a soul like Kafka's, Willy Haas remarks, "is possible only in hell." Suburban Vienna, and the meadows around Gmunden, were a totally alien décor.

Certainly these letters, as self-revealing as anything (and everything) Kafka ever wrote, give the over-all impression of a dedicated self-destroyer. "Life is a dream, and it must and should become one," wrote Novalis. If, and whenever, life for a moment ceased to be for Kafka the cold approaches to his unattainable Castle, or ceased to be fraught with the fearful anticipations of *The Trial,* then Kafka went to infinite pains to restore all things to their (for him) true and inevitable order.

The letters to Milena go on, long after both lovers realized all was over. The two years they cover are those in which *The Castle* was written. In the end, as in the beginning, Milena becomes again "Dear Frau Milena," and Kafka tells her obliquely about Dora Dymant, who became his companion during his last months. He died of TB in 1924: Milena survived to live through years of hell in concentration camps, and to die there.

Rarely in literature has a relationship between two adults of comparable stature been given us so entire. Compared with, say, Byron's letters to Countess Guiccioli, or George Sand's to Chopin, the profound contrast between a sincere Jew and surface Christians stands out like a sore thumb.

For if Kafka was sure of any one thing, it was the Fall. "Sometimes I believe that I understand the Fall from Grace as no other person," he wrote, and he seems, as these letters show, actually to have experienced the Fall psychologically, intellectually, emotionally, and even physically. Indeed, only the greatest of prophets and saints have apprehended the true inwardness of the state of man between the Fall and the Redemption as did Kafka. He explores, in *The Castle,* as Thomas Mann points out in his "homage," every possible relationship between God and Man. Except the only one that is supremely, currently, valid —the Incarnation. Since Thomas Mann is as unaware of the Incarnation as was Kafka, he notes that *"The Castle* has as its central theme the grotesque unconnection between the human being and the transcendental. The incommensurability of the divine, the strange uncanny, demonic illogicality, the 'ungettable' remoteness, cruelty, yes wickedness, by any human standards, of the Castle, in other words, of the powers above!" For, since the Fall, and until the Incarnation, all human contact with God must be that of a convict with his judge, and must be accompanied by all the self-justification, and the twisted rationalizations, that infected human beings can and obviously do so constantly invent.

"Love is to me that you are the knife which I turn within myself," Kafka wrote Milena, and warns her: "as in the deep sea there is no tiniest spot that isn't always under the heaviest pressure, so it is with you." Also, "the blame piles up in endless succession until it reaches the gray Original Sin, since it cannot be

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otherwise in the living together of human beings." Yet for Kafka, Milena had also been sunlight, a possibility of grace—"the most wonderful thing I'd ever seen." With her he was "so happy, so proud, so free, so powerful, so at home." But, fundamentally, "I was still only the animal, belonged still only in the forest, lived here in the open only by your grace," and this "could not last." He must "return to the darkness, I couldn't stand the sun." He must "live in my dirt, that's my business," though the "terrible thing is that through you I have become much more conscious of my dirt." Perhaps Milena, had she been more truly Christian, might have brought him to a sense of the Redemption. And would that she, or we, or any Christian, could have Kafka's perception of our true condition were it not for the Redemption! Then, perhaps, we might rightly receive the Good News. Instead, like Byron, most Christians rejoice that the whole rather embarrassing episode of the Fall and the Atonement are over and done with, and use the love that moves the sun and all the stars to excuse our hangovers, our quickies in taxis, all our pimply sins.

Perhaps the great message the Jews still have for us is this sense, to which Kafka witnessed, of the unmitigated horror of each man's condition unless the Redemption is accepted and shared. "One man fights at Marathon, and the other in the dining room," Kafka tells Milena, "but it is the same battle." And again, "once the dish has been placed on the table, each Jew has to take his share from the awful, poisonous but also old and essentially eternal fare."

This century is dominated by the scientific discoveries of three great Jews: Marx, Freud and Einstein. But perhaps it is the discovery of a fourth, Kafka, which is the same discovery as that of all the Prophets, from Noah through Malachi, which is the necessary corollary to the other three. What man essentially *is* since the Fall, Marx and Freud prove; and what he *does* with Einstein's gifts already a few Americans know (and more Japanese). Marx, Freud and Einstein are today's Magi, but unless they bring their gifts to God's manger, they must bring them to their, and our, sepulchre.

Gentle and good, Kafka has yet suffered in himself the urge of "the eternal Jew, being senselessly drawn, wandering senselessly through a senselessly obscene world." Kafka was absolutely aware that all his so-called illnesses "were matters of faith." "I'm mentally ill, the disease of the lungs is nothing but an overflowing of my mental disease," he tells Milena, and adds that sleep "is the most innocent creature, and a sleepless man the most guilty." Among the damnations "there is that eternal damnation which consists in having to go through life once more with the eye of knowledge."

Thomas Mann suggests that what Kafka really wanted was to be one of the boys, to be accepted by and in the village, and to settle down there, blissfully content never to arrive at the Castle. He quotes his own Tonio Kroger's "blisses of the commonplace" as being Kafka's true yen. Perhaps no Gentile who is not a Christian can begin to understand Kafka's total turning to God; only the successful Christian, i.e., only the saint, is as God-intoxicated as a true Jew. Certainly it would seem that Thomas Mann oversimplifies both his Creator and Kafka.

Kafka was lucky always in his translators, from Milena on. The *Letters to Milena* are quite astonishingly well rendered by Tania and James Stern: here is no trace of accent, only the English language that has taken unto itself Kafka. Both books are furthermore beautifully produced and jacketed.

The Freedoms

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT. By C. Herman Pritchett. University of Chicago. $5.

By THOMAS E. KENNELLY

ONE of our widely held intellectual insincerities is that ours is "a government of laws not of men." Although not always ac-

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knowledged, the facts to the contrary are well known. They are apparent to anyone who takes a moment to reflect, for example, upon the range of discretion open to administrators and judges in applying and interpreting statutes. But the extent to which social philosophy and policy preferences enter into the exercise of official discretion often is only a matter of conjecture. And at the very highest level—decision-making by the Supreme Court—the evidence is scanty indeed.

In this book C. Herman Pritchett, Professor and Chairman of the political science department in the University of Chicago, has continued his analysis of the Supreme Court begun in *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values,* published in 1948. It is Mr. Pritchett's contention that although it is difficult to develop means for appraising the influence of individual justices upon the direction of the Court's decision-making it is by no means a hopeless task. The principal clues to their thought processes lie in the non-unanimous, written opinions of the Court. Accordingly it is to these decisions that he turns to look into the state of civil liberties under the guardianship of the Vinson Court from 1946 to 1953.

The record of the Vinson Court evaluated in the light of libertarian values is not an impressive one. The period saw the conviction of the top leaders of the Communist party for violation of the Smith Act, the removal of public school teachers on disloyalty grounds under the New York Feinberg law, as well as other decisions tending to limit the protections afforded by the first amendment. The most significant indictment of the Court, however, results from its inability to invent a formula for our perilous times sufficiently reasonable to engage a working consensus of the justices.

To document his case, Mr. Pritchett has attempted to establish the positions taken by individual justices in support of, or in opposition to, the doctrines announced by the Court. Besides the Communist issue, and the loyalty of school teachers issues, Mr. Pritchett has examined the principal civil liberties cases in other fields including segregation in the schools, the rights of aliens, censorship of motion pictures, standards for criminal prosecutions conducted in both federal and state courts, and the like. A formidable task in view of the fact that the Vinson Court, if tested by the proportion of non-unanimous decisions handed down, was more divided than any in history.

Mr. Pritchett's summary of decisions is economical; his style pithy, sometimes ironic; his commentary learned and incisive. He leaves no question as to his belief that disagreement among the justices on the fundamentals of our constitutional system has inevitably weakened the moral authority of the court. He assigns blame for the fragmentation of opinion to a basic inability of the Court to formulate pragmatic doctrines in harmony with "a society in a state of siege." He castigates both the absolutistic position, which sees no difference between prior restraint aimed at "Jehovah's Witnesses ringing doorbells" and that aimed at "the gigantic conspiracy of the Communist party," as well as the position of judicial self-restraint—the tradition of the strong legislature-weak judiciary formula—which has led the Vinson Court to cast doubt on its own credentials as an able participant in the process of interpreting the Constitution.

Mr. Pritchett's recommendation to resolve the impasse faced by the Court has merit. He suggests that doctrinal floundering might be replaced by a reasonable hypothesis through an investigation into the line of reasoning opened up by Justice Harlan Stone in a footnote to a case decided in 1938. Stone felt that the Court should police the *process* by which political decisions are reached, " . . . for, unless there is freedom to circulate ideas and unless the representative system is in good order, there can be no confidence in its end product." Such a formula, writes Mr. Pritchett, might have produced "standards of judicial review with limits binding enough to satisfy justices genuinely concerned about judicial nullification of the popular will, while at the same time providing a positive guide to replace the negativism and undue deference of the self restraint philosophy."

Whether one agrees with the author's conclusions or not, the organization and analysis of the material contained in the book in itself is an important contribution to an understanding of the Supreme Court both as an institution, and as conceived by the men who compose it acting in their role of justices.

Power Struggle

THE COBWEB. By William Gibson. Knopf. $3.95

By ROBERT H. BOYLE

MR. William Gibson's first novel is a curious compound of the commercial, the cosy and the cinematic concocted, one concludes, for Dore and Darryl and the pukka peasants of Pelham, Paoli and Peoria.

This reviewer dislikes to indulge in extracurricular insights, but it would appear that Mr. Gibson, a quondam contributor to the *Partisan Review,* has curbed his passion for poetry to concentrate on cash. He should succeed financially with his novel, especially after the studios submit their final bids. *The Cobweb* is nothing more than a lower case *Caine Mutiny* of the clinic constructed to satisfy the aesthetic of a popular culture and the facile narrative of the film.

Briefly, it concerns the personal and professional struggles for power among the staff and patients of the Castle House Clinic for Nervous Disorders in Platte City, Nebraska. These struggles are enacted against a background of draperies—it appears several of the characters can't agree which pair to hang in the clinic. Among those involved are the assistant director, Dr. Stewart McIver, who bears, one suspects, more than an accidental resemblance to Gregory Peck with his "lincolnesque" physique and "long face" which shows a "bony intelli-

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gence, horse-like and serene"; a mad young artist named Stevie who scrawls "Dr. McIver is not your father"; McIver's narcissistic wife, Karen; the alcoholic director, Dr. Doug Devereux; and an artzy-craftzy aide named Meg who tools leather when she isn't carrying on laconic conversations with McIver in her garrow. By the time the curtain goes down on the draperies, Mr. Gibson's characters have so ensnared themselves in plots and counterplots that they make jockeying for position in the Politburo look like elections in the Girl Guides.

Moreover, the author has packed a good part of *The Cobweb* in prayer-wheel prose, that dum-dum documentary style which makes the scenarist's job so much the easier. To cite one instance at random:

> Her first act, after putting her things down on top of the old trunk, was to lift the phone from the book and record cabinet she had made of common pine but not yet stained and call Miss Inch's number. There was no answer. Her second was to bathe; the tiny bathroom had no shower, only a tub which hardly contained her long sturdy legs, but she'd attached a rubber spray-hose to the faucet, which served. While she was toweling herself the phone commenced to ring. Meg stepped out of the tub with wet feet, dried them briefly, went back with the towel around her neck and answered. It was a male voice at the other end, familiar and strange.

And so it goes. But the sad thing is one has the feeling Mr. Gibson could have done so much better. *The Cobweb* is not without its good moments, and there is no doubt but that Mr. Gibson is a first-rate craftsman. There are times when he promises to exploit the commonplace with a poetic bitterness, and there are other occasions when his metallic style reflects a dazzling talent. As for the Joycean touch, only another novel will tell whether it represents a vestigal remain bound to diminish in the onslaught of success.

Final Ends

THE LAST THINGS. By Romano Guardini. Translated by Charlotte Forsyth and Grace Branham. Pantheon. $2.75.

By ROBERT PAUL MOHAN

ONE of the most interesting postwar themes in contemporary Protestant and Catholic theology is the relation between eschatology and history, born of an undestandable awareness of the apocalyptic character of twentieth-century life. Barth, Cullman, Wood, Niebuhr, and Tillich in Protestant circles, and Huby, Didier, Feret, Malevez, and Bouyer in Catholic circles, are among those whose work on this provocative but elusive problem has attracted attention.

Monsignor Guardini's summary, however, cannot be classified as a recent work in the field, as it is but a delayed translation of *Die Letzten Dinge,* originally published in Würzburg in 1940. The distinguished German liturgist and philosopher-theologian analyzes the problems of death, purification, resurrection, judgment, and eternity, and presents a brief case for the Christian answer in the light of an *eschaton* that invests the historical process with its ultimate significance.

It is perhaps invidious to consider this little work a *succès d'estime,* if one expects more thorough treatment in a work which the author intended to be but an outline. But it is indeed questionable that such subjects as "The Nature of History" and "General Views on World Judgment" *can* be adequately summarized in such an elliptical fashion.

The author does bring out in sharp relief, however, the difference of an authentically Christian appraisal of history from the two forms which supposedly exhaust the means of historical evaluation—the rectilinear futurism of the apostle of progress, and the cyclical recurrence theme of Nietzsche and the Greeks.

For the Christian answer bears no resemblance to that cyclicism assailed by Saint Augustine repeatedly in his *City of God* and almost universally taken for granted in the Greek mind; and the resemblance

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it bears to linear secular futurism is superficial.

Apocalyptic history, to use Collingwood's expression, is built around an event in the body of the historical process. To the Christian, this event is not the bland Coué-like adulation of the future, but the Incarnation of the Son of God, envisaging it is true a final *eschaton,* but established temporally in a specific historical context in the past. Monsignor Guardini emphasizes the fact that the act of judgment is " . . . an act of Jesus Christ, Who was once on earth and now reigns in eternal glory."

Whereas the secular progressivist looks wistfully in the direction of a future that will inevitably be better, the Christian looks both to an Incarnation in an historical past, and a *parousia* in a Revealed future.

The author considers too both physical and spiritual aspects of man's supernatural destiny, and the nature and necessity of purification. But he is perhaps most effective in his opening analysis of the Christian's approach to the problem of death, and the importance of that moment when life's accounts are finally closed.

What the author chooses to say, he says well, although he does seem to ignore the role of Descartes in his discussion of the historical consequences of the Mind-Matter dichotomy in philosophical thought.

If one seeks the Catholic position on the ultimate problems of human life presented in an almost catechism-like brevity, he might find this volume helpful; but if one seeks comprehensive answers to the problems raised, he will not find them in this book, which, it seems, says only the first things about the "last things."

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Angry Man

PRELUDE TO WORLD WAR II. By Gaetano Salvemini. Doubleday. $7.50.

By M. A. FITZSIMONS

HERE is a book seething with an exile's implacable anger. Even the turn of fortune which made possible Professor Salvemini's return to Italy has not softened him. His return, however, has diverted the course of his wrath to those foreign governments and shapers of foreign public opinion who helped to maintain Mussolini in power and the Italian people in slavery. *Prelude to World War II,* then, is a work of national piety, a vindication of Salvemini's countrymen against their liberators, particularly the British.

The book's title is misleading. The volume presents an animated account of Italy's relations with the major European powers from the advent of Mussolini until the end of the Italo-Ethiopian War. This subject matter permits the author to pursue three vendettas.

The first is directed against Mussolini, whose unprincipled and even aimless career as a disturber of European peace is described. Mussolini's empty arrogance and turbulent vanity were revealed from the very beginning of his control of the Italian state. Yet, he was hailed as

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
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the redeemer of Italy from Communism, the restorer of order and the architect of peace with the Church. Foreign conservatives usually saw him as a sound man and were impervious to hostile arguments based on the *Duce's* own speeches and actions. Apologetic fervor and sophisticated cynicism joined in a tradition of disregarding the Fascist cult of war, the *Duce's* totalitarian teachings and papal criticisms of the Fascist state. It would be easy, I believe, to argue that our present difficulties are as much the responsibility of unprincipled and dishonest conservatives in the inter-war years as of naive radicalism.

Salvemini's two other targets are the foreign journalists and political figures, including George V, who gave aid and comfort to the Italian dictatorship at home and abroad, and the British Foreign Office, including Anthony Eden. The author regards British foreign policy as responsible for supporting the *Duce,* encouraging his expansionist ambitions and destroying European and League efforts to check him. British policy later encouraged Hitler in the belief that he would turn on Russia.

The author's case, especially against Anthony Eden, is impressive but exaggerated. There is a McCarthy-ish logic in Salvemini's argument that his explanation must be correct, for otherwise "British foreign policy after 1934 becomes a succession of absurd muddles." Doubtless British foreign policy was not quite so muddled and not even so innocent as Stanley Baldwin seemed to be but even the English, if not *angeli,* are *Angli* and *homines, non diaboli.* The author's sources are limited to books published more than five years ago and a fuller and more reliable story awaits the publication of the British diplomatic documents.

REVIEWERS

Thomas E. Kennelly is a critic who lives in Chicago.

Robert H. Boyle is a New York newspaperman.

Father Robert Paul Mohan, S.S. is a professor of Theology at the Catholic University of America.

M. A. Fitzsimons is a member of the history faculty at Notre Dame.

Personal

Gunnar D. Kumlien, who reports from Rome for The Commonweal, is a Swedish newspaperman who has lived half his lifetime in the Eternal City. Kumlien covers the Mediterranean area for *Stockholms-Tidningen,* a leading Swedish daily. Naturally enough, he speaks Swedish and Italian fluently, but he is equally at home in German, Spanish, English and French and writes for publication in all these languages. He is merely able to get by in Russian and Arabic, he says, and has only a smattering of Polish.

Kumlien went to school in England and France and has traveled widely in Europe and the Middle East (part of his "parish" as a newspaper correspondent) but has not yet visited the U.S. A lecture tour over here is now in the offing.

Mme. Kumlien is a member of an old Roman family and one of Italy's great beauties. They have five young children, who are equally at home in Rome or Stockholm. Kumlien, as the national of a neutral country, reported from Rome throughout the several Italian phases of World War II. Later he covered the Arab-Israeli war. He is a member of the very small Swedish Catholic group in Rome centered around the Bridgettine convent.

Kumlien became a Catholic when he was still in prep school. He belonged to a family which believed in leaving children free to make up their own minds about religion. Young Gunnar instinctively chose Catholicism and has never wavered since. He recently wrote a book, in Swedish, setting forth the Catholic view of Sex, which aroused considerable interest in his native land, where, he tells us, interest in Waugh, Greene and Undset has provoked a lively concern for all things Catholic.

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A Note of Thanks

With this issue The Commonweal completes the first two months of its vital drive for eight thousand new subscribers during its Thirtieth Anniversary year. To be one-fifth of the way at this date constitutes a promising start.

For the general interest manifested by subscribers, for their letters and notes of encouragement and various suggestions we are extremely grateful. We wish to express our special thanks to the hundreds of subscribers who thus far have taken on a share in the campaign as a personal responsibility—to those who have persuaded friends to try The Commonweal for the next six months, or who have ordered gift subscriptions. They have given the campaign its important initial impetus. But many more subscriptions are needed.

We therefore appeal to other readers to build on this good foundation by winning new readers from among their relatives and friends. For this is The Commonweal's big chance to reach the general circulation level of the other leading American weekly journals of opinion.

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